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Growth Variability among and within African Countries: 








There is a considerable literature on the growth performance of the sub-
Saharan countries, which tends to focus on average rates of growth over 
shorter or longer periods.  This paper demonstrates that a key 
characteristic of the countries of the sub-Saharan region is the instability 
of growth rates, across countries, but, even more, for individual countries 
over time.  The dispersion of country growth rates is not normally 
distributed;  on the contrary, measures of dispersion are negatively 
correlated with long-term growth rates.  It is argued that this instability, 
greater than in other regions, is the result of underdevelopment.  Reducing 
instability is a task of long-run development policy, rather than short-term 
macro management.  Further, it is probably the case that aspects of market 





 There is a considerable amount written on the growth performance of the sub-
Saharan countries, but little of this focuses upon a central characteristic of their growth 
over the last forty years:  the tremendous year-to year variability of growth rates.  In part 
this is a result of the statistical techniques and analytical models used by various authors 
and international institutions.  It also arises from a predilection of mainstream theory to 
view growth as an equilibrium process, and deviations from the ideal path to be the result 
of random ‘shocks’ or policy mistakes.  This paper approaches growth variability from an 
agnostic point of view, first inspecting the degree to which it afflicts the sub-Saharan 
countries, then considering the causes of the considerable instability revealed by 
empirical evidence.   
 This an issue that must be approached with an analytically unbiased framework, 
that does not presume that causes of instability fall into the familiar and hackneyed 
categories of internal and external.  Particularly problematic is the common use of 
‘internal’ factors as synonymous with ‘government policy.  The categories used here are 
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1) structural characteristics of a country, 2) world market influences, and 3) policy 
measures by the government.  Whether the latter be wise or foolish, the desired outcome 
by the policy makers can be thwarted by the structure of the country and world market 
influences.  While this point may seem general to the point of banal and vacuous, one 
finds in the policy literature a tendency to make the leap from judging a policy to be 
appropriate (on theoretical or ideological criteria), to the presumption that it will produce 
the predicted outcome.  All policies are implemented ceterius paribus, or mutates 
mutandus.  As a result, the actual outcome can differ substantially from the intended 
outcome (as rational expectations theory showed).  If the change is circumstances is 
particularly extreme, the ex ante ‘sound’ policy could produce an outcome worse than an 
‘unsound’ policy. 
 Analysing the variability of growth is important for both analytical and policy 
purposes.  The analytical importance lines in its implication for how one views average 
values, which conceal important clues about a country’s economic performance.  When 
one finds, for example, that over almost forty years, Burkina Faso and Rwanda had the 
same average growth rate (3.4 and 3.3 percent per annum, respectively), one might 
conclude that their growth performances were quite similar.  This judgement would be 
reassessed by the discovery that the standard deviation of the growth rate for the former 
was 3.4 and for the latter 12.2.  With regard to policy, it will argued that the growth 
variability in sub-Saharan countries is so great, even excluding conflict-affected 
countries, that it cannot credibly to explained (or dismissed) as the result of ‘poor policy’.  
It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the growth variability arises from structural 
characteristics of the countries, which have a historical and social basis.  As such, short-
term macroeconomic policy may have limited impact on growth variability, though they 
may affect the average in the short term.  
 As we shall see, for some sub-Saharan countries, the variability of the growth rate 
was been associated with relatively low growth, for others there is no significant 
relationship, and for a few the relationship was positive.  This paper does not enter into 
the discussion over the interaction between variability and average growth performance is 
positive or negative.  Rather, we argue that growth instability among the sub-Saharan 
countries, considerably higher than for other reasons, indicates important structural 
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characteristics that can guide the analysis of how the region might achieve sustainable 
high growth.  However, the paper does pass a general negative judgement on growth 
variability.  As Collier and Gunning (1999) have argued, the sub-Saharan countries are 
characterised by high degrees of risk, which impacts negatively on domestic producers 
and potential foreign investors.  Growth variability is perhaps the purest aggregate 




The Variability of Growth in the Sub-Sahara 
 
 
 In this paper, I am careful not to use the term ‘vulnerability’ or, more specifically, 
‘structural vulnerability’, a concept developed by the Committee for Development Policy 
to mean ‘the risk of being negatively affected by unforeseen events beyond the control of 
country’ (Committee for Development Policy 2000, p. 12).  While the measures used 
below may be relevant to vulnerability, they derive from growth rates themselves, rather 
than measures or proxies for factors determining vulnerability, which itself may or may 
not imply growth variability.   
 A country’s average growth rate over a period reveals relatively little about the 
economy.  The pattern of growth rates over time generates substantially more information 
about the nature of the economy and, to a certain extent, about the economy’s relation to 
international markets.  In this section an inspection is made of the variation in growth 
rates within and among sub-Saharan countries that will provide the basis of an analysis of 
policy. 
 The regional growth pattern is shown in Figure 1, where there two series, on for 
the countries with continuous data, 1961-1998 (complete data, ‘CD’, 31 countries), and 
one for all countries with data for any year (‘all’, maximum 42).1  The two series hardly 
diverge, so the latter is used in Figure 2 to include as many countries as possible.  Figure 
2 displays the average growth rate and standard deviation of growth rates across 
                                                
1 The largest countries omitted are Liberia and Somalia. 
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countries.  In only six of the thirty-eight years was the standard deviation lower than the 
cross-country growth rate, and these occur with apparent randomness.2 
 The standard deviation does not capture the full extend of growth variability, or 
its complexity.  Table 1 provides several indicators of variability to attempt to do this.  
The first column of the table gives the number of years for which there are GDP growth 
statistics.  For every country the series is continuous and ends in 1998.  The second 
column gives the percent of years for which the growth rate of the country was above the 
average for the region, which is followed by the growth rate itself, the standard deviation, 
and the coefficient of variation.  These basic growth statistics are completed with the 
inclusion of the relative growth rate in column seven, which is the country average 
divided by the regional average (with the latter calculated for the years for which there 
are data for the country).  Columns eight and nine report the number of times each 
country was among the ten fastest and ten slowest growers, by decade (1960s, 1970s, 
etc.).  The final three columns attempt to capture extreme shifts in growth rates, 
arbitrarily defined as a year-to-year change in the absolute value of the growth rate equal 
to or greater than ten percentage points.  This is followed by the percentage of years 
when this occurred, and, finally, the number of these shifts that were consecutive. 
 Except for the familiar statistics in the first seven columns, a brief explanation of 
these measures is required.  The ‘league table’ ordering of countries, whose details are 
shown in Figure 2, provides two relevant pieces of information.  First, it indicates the 
decade standard for the fastest and slowest growers.  It is reasonable to presume that 
under the best of policies and most favourable world market conditions, the regional 
growth rate could not have exceeded the average for the ten fastest growers.  Given the 
performance over the four decades a realistic sustainable ‘high-growth’ target for the 
region would be in the range of five to six percent per annum. 
 Second, the league table measures indicate the relationship between the best and 
worst performances.  If we subtract the fast average from the slow (the line ‘F – S’), it 
appears that the gap was relatively stable, from about five to six percentage points, except 
for the 1970s all of the ‘top ten’ grew at seven percent or more, compared to only seven 
                                                
2 The ratio (coefficient of variation) is unity or less once in the 1960s, twice in the 1970s and 
1980s, and one in the 1990s. 
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occurrences of such rates during the other three decades.  The growth rates for the four 
decades suggest that world market conditions may shift the average growth performance 
for the region up and down, but have limited impact on the relationship between the best 
and worst performers. 
 It is to be expected that one would find that countries migrate in and out of the top 
and bottom ten.  However, there are clear cases of persistent high growers and low 
growers.  Five countries appear in the top ten at least three times, Botswana, the only one 
with the maximum of four times, and Mauritius, Malawi, Lesotho and Kenya.  Three of 
the five can perhaps be explained by special circumstances, Botswana and Lesotho, small 
countries and contiguous to South Africa, and Mauritius, which is an island with little 
ethnic or structural similarities to the continental countries.  The third member of the 
Southern African Customs Union, Swaziland, appears in the top ten only once, but had 
the third highest growth rate for the region, just behind Lesotho.  At the other extreme, 
there were two consistently low growth countries, the Central African Republic and 
Madagascar, both in the both ten for all decades. 
 Much more striking than the persistent fast and slow growers are the nine 
countries (twenty percent of the total) that could be found in the top ten in one decade 
and the bottom ten in another.  Perhaps the most extraordinary case is Cameroon, in a 
select ten very decade:  twice among the fastest, twice among the slowest.  While such 
startling reversals might be attributed to being either conflict affected or a petroleum 
exporter, Cote d’Ivoire and Benin show the save switch between top and bottom.  Thus, 
Table 2 shows an important characteristic of growth performances in the Sub-Saharan 
region:  while in every decade the region had countries with outstanding growth rates, 
even ones in the range of the so-called High Performing Asian Economies, only one 
country of the forty-three could sustain such rates over the long run. 
 Perhaps the purest indicator of instability is extreme growth reversals.  Of the 
1350 country-years summarised in the table, in fifteen percent growth changed by more 
than ten percentage points.  Sixty-eight percent of these large shifts came as consecutive 
growth reversals; i.e., a change of ten percent or more was followed by a greater than ten 
percent change of the opposite sign. Relatively well-performing Malawi, with a four-
decade growth rate of 4.4, experienced during 192-1995 growth reversals of –16, 17, -20, 
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and 26 percent.  The high frequency of consecutive growth reversals implies that large 
shifts were not random, but concentrated in seizures of instability.  Inspection of the 
clustering of reversals shows no obvious general cause, such as changes in the terms of 
trade, conflict, changes in government, or major policy shifts, though all these appear as 
influences during one period or another. 
 The final measure of instability is given in column three and may seem a bit odd.  
For each country the number of years that growth was above the regional average is 
expressed as a percentage of all years.  If the actual growth rates were normally 
distributed around the mean, the correlation between this percentage and the mean should 
be close to unity.  When the calculation is done the adjusted correlation coefficient 
proves to be .55.  An extreme case is Mozambique, which over eighteen years, 1981-
1998, had above average growth in ten years, but an average growth rate barely half the 
regional.  The percentage of years above the average comp ared to relative growth means 
that country growth rates were skewed.  For the region as a whole, the skew is negative, 
as Figures 4 and 5 show, the former for growth rates themselves, and the latter for the 
absolute first difference.  The mean growth rate across countries for all years was 3.5, 
compared to the median value of 3.1.  Thus, sixty percent of growth rates lay below the 
average.  There is a reverse pattern for first differences, with a mean (by definition) of 
zero, and a median of 0.1, though again with negative skewedness. 
 Table 3 shows that the growth variability for the Sub-Saharan countries was 
considerably greater than for other regions.  While only twenty-one percent of the Sub-
Saharan countries had either no growth shift of ten percent or more, or only one, the 
percents for Latin American and the Caribbean and Asia were almost double that number.  
Similarly, the umber of years of such growth shifts was half or less than the Sub-Saharan 
percentage in those tow regions.  While the North Africa and West Asia region had a 
higher percentage of years with large growth shifts, almost a third were for one country, 
Syria.  Coefficients of variation of growth rate show a similar pattern:  though the Sub-
Sahara, Latin America and the Caribbean, and North Africa and West Asia all had similar 
average rates of growth, that for the former was substantially above those for the other 
two regions.  The Asian group had not only the lowest coefficient of variation, but also 
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the lowest standard error, and the order of regions by standard deviations is the same as 
for coefficients of variation. 
 
 
Growth Variability and Growth Prospects 
 
 The foregoing discussion of growth variability provides the basis for a 
consideration of growth prospects for the sub-Saharan region in the medium term.  Such 
an exercise is fraught with difficulties, and the analytical landscape of the sub-Sahara is 
littered with ex ante predictions that proved to be ex post embarrassments, usually due to 
excessive optimism.  The approach here is to generate ‘scenarios’ on the basis of placing 
countries into categories, derived from the characteristics of their growth performances.  
For current purposes, the definition of ‘sustainable’ growth is a target rate maintained 
over the decade.  The target itself is 2.5 percent per capita, which implies a doubling of 
per capita income by 2030.  By comparison to Asia, this is a modest target, but would 
represent a substantial improvement for sub-Saharan countries. 
 The likelihood that the countries of the sub-Sahara could attain this target on 
average is analysed in Tables 5 and 6.  Since sustained growth was defined as 2.5 percent 
per capita over a decade, for each country ten-year moving averages of the per capita 
growth rate were calculated.  Table 5 reports the number of ten-year periods for which 
this average was achieved, by country, along with the time periods.  On the basis of the 
number of time periods and the variations in growth (from the previous section), the 
countries are divided into six categories in Table 6.  The table reports several statistics for 
each category:  the average growth rate of countries, the standard deviation, and the 
percentage of ten-year periods for which the target rate was met or exceeded.  The last 
statistic is taken as a rough proxy of the probability of the countries achieving the target 
rate during 2001-2010.  
A country qualifies for category one if it that had moving averages at or above 2.5 
percent per capita for at least half of the ten-year time periods.  If the region as a whole 
were to achieve the target rate of growth, over half the countries would fall into this 
category.  However, the five countries that ex post meet the criterion for this category 
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were not typical of the continent as a whole.  Two were island states, and the other three 
closely linked to South Africa, especially Lesotho and Swaziland.  Given the very slow 
rate of growth of the South African economy in the 1990s, it might be that the later two 
countries would have difficulty maintaining their historically high rate of growth. 
 Category two includes those countries that failed to sustain the target rate, but 
enjoyed strong growth for extended periods (three or more consecutive periods of 2.5 or 
higher).  This category is sub-divided into countries whose strong performances were 
before 1990 (‘old success stories’), and those were occurred after 1990s (‘new success 
stories’).  Both sub-sets of countries have virtually the same long-term growth rates, and 
very high standard deviations, relatively to those growth rates.  As for those in category 
one, the four countries whose growth performances were strong in the 1990s (but not 
before) provide limited guidance for rejuvenating growth for the region as a whole.  
Equatorial Guinea’s phenomenal growth was the result of the discovery of petroleum, not 
policy changes.  The strong performances of Uganda and Mozambique reflect the end of 
debilitating internal conflicts, as well as large inflows of concessional finance.  For 
countries still suffering conflict, there may be lessons to consider (see category 6).  The 
Sudan was an interesting case, a country beset by conflict, yet with a strong growth 
performance in the 1990s.  This unlikely combination might result form the regional 
concentration of the conflict. 
 Prior to the 1990s there were five countries that had shown the capacity for 
sustained rapid growth (category 2a), though two of the cases involved petroleum 
exports, which were highly sensitive to world prices.  Perhaps most interesting of the five 
were Kenya and Malawi, which performed quite well in the 1970s, but deteriorated 
dramatically in subsequent years.  These two countries would be logical candidates from 
which to seek lessons for reviving growth in the sub-Saharan region. 
 Categories one and two account for fourteen, or exactly one third, of the countries 
under review.  It would be realistic, if somewhat optimistic, to anticipate that these could 
all achieve the target rate during 2001-2010.  Among categories three, four and five, there 
are few additional candidates.  The three countries in category three share the unfortunate 
characteristic of low and stable long-term growth, with no ten-year periods that meet the 
target.  Category four is somewhat more promising, for all seven of the countries passed 
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through episodes of growth sustained at 2.5 percent or higher.  However, for all the 
countries save one (Chad), these periods ended in the 1970s.  High growth variability, 
negative on average, was the plight of the eleven countries in category five.  Of these 
eleven, none sustained 2.5 percent for a decade.  Finally, there are the countries affected 
by serious conflicts in the 1990s (excluding Sudan, see above).  Even should ‘peace 
breakout’ in these countries, they have shown little potential for high growth, with the 
exceptions of Burundi and Rwanda. 
 The projection for growth during 2001-2010 is based on the following rather 
optimistic assumptions: 
1. that the high growth countries achieve four percent, slightly above their long-
term average; 
2. that the intermittent ‘success stories’ (category 2) countries improve to an 
average of three percent; 
3. that the low growth countries (categories 3 and 4) double their long-term 
average to two percent;  and  
4. that the zero-growth countries (category 5) and conflict-affected countries 
achieve one percent. 
 Were these growth rates achieved, the average across all forty-two countries 
would be slightly less than two percent per capita.  While this average should be 
considered modest at best, it would represent a doubling of the long-term growth rate for 
the region.  Growth at two percent would be insufficient for most countries to achieve a 
substantial reduction in poverty by 2010.  Therefore, there is a strong case for 
redistributive policies, which can be effective even in low-income countries (Dagdeviren, 
van der Hoeven & Weeks 2001). 
  
 
Drawing Conclusions from Low Growth and Growth Variability 
 
 The discussion has stressed the importance of the variability of growth in the 
analysis of growth prospects for the sub-Saharan region.  To complete the discussion, a 
consideration of the causes of variability is necessary.  The general hypothesis proposed 
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is that growth variability is a negative function of the level of development.  That is, it is 
in the nature of the development process that societies produce mechanisms that reduce 
the tendency of an economy to expand or contract by extreme values.  This basic 
relationship is modified by the particular circumstances of each country.  First, that 
hypothesis is tested in a simple manner,3 then its implications pursued. 
 The hypothesis is tested using average values over the entire period for which 
data are available, using taking the coefficient of variation of the growth rate as the 
dependent variable and per capita income as an approximate measure (‘proxy’) for the 
level of development.  Two other obvious factors affecting variability are included as 
binary variables, whether a country is a petroleum exporter, and whether it has 
experienced severe conflict.  In a latter version, petroleum exports as a share of GDP, and 
proportion of years that were conflict affected will be used.4  The results are sown in 
Table 4.  With thirty-eight degrees of freedom, the significance of the coefficient on per 
capita income falls below the .05 level, and the sign is as hypothesised.  Without more 
precise measurement of the other two variables, it is inappropriate to draw conclusion 
about the size of the coefficient. The coefficient on the binary variable for petroleum 
exporters is of the predicted sign, but its t-statistic is above the conventional ten percent 
level.  However, the near-significance of the statistic suggests that a numerical variable 
might produce the predicted result.  The conflict variable conforms to expectations, 
though the significance is close to the minimally acceptable level.  Overall, I take this 
initial hypothesis test to justify an analytical discussion in which the principal cause of 
variability of growth is the level of development. 
 One should expect variability to be negatively affected by the level of 
development for three broad reasons:  predominance of agriculture, the 
underdevelopment of markets, and a weak state structure.  To labour an obvious point, 
agriculture is the only sector of the economy that is overwhelmingly dependent upon 
natural phenomena.  This dependence arises from the fertility of the soil, weather, and 
living organisms (pests and disease).  Further, the more underdeveloped a country, the 
less able are its agricultural producers to mitigate the impact of natural phenomena.  As 
                                                
3 The hypothesis will be tested in more sophisticated manner in the revision of this paper. 
4 For identifying conflict years, see Cramer & Weeks (2000) and Messer, Cohen & D’Costa (1998). 
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countries develop, producers mitigate the impact through a range of practices and 
technologies:  disease and drought resistant varieties, pesticides and herbicides, 
fertilisers, irrigation, and crop insurance, to name the most obvious.  Underdevelopment 
delivers a double blow with regard to agriculture:  on the one hand, the sector is large, 
and, on the other, producers are less able to use the available methods for reducing the 
impact of natural phenomena.  The latter is the result of lack of information due to poor 
communications and limited extension services, lack of affordable credit (in part due to 
high risk premia), and the markets that would supply the mitigating goods and services.  
Collier and Gunning (1999) have correctly characterised the sub-Saharan as ‘high risk’, 
and nowhere is this more destabilising than what is typically the largest sector of the 
economy, agriculture. 
 With regard to markets, there is considerable confusion, reflected in the 
conventional dichotomy between state and market, and the presumption that the so-called 
failures of the latter are the result of actions by the former.  Within this simplified 
framework, standard economics frequently fails to analyse usefully the constraints facing 
producers in low-income countries because of its strong tendency (somewhat changed in 
recent years) to take markets as natural phenomenon that arise spontaneously from 
individual acts of exchange.  Part of the problem is that the word ‘ market’ is frequently 
used with considerable ambiguity.  The word has a number of meanings relevant to 
economics, which include: a concrete usage, markets as entities that are socially 
constructed; a theoretical usage that typically abstracts from the social context of 
markets;  and, a political usage, that endorses a particular form of organisation for 
society.  Stated briefly, these can be organised under the following categories: 
1.  ‘Market’ can refer to a concrete place, where at specific times under formal and 
often strict rules, buying and selling occurs.  In this sense the London Stock 
Exchange or the collection of money changers in the Kano (Nigeria) old city are 
markets. 
2. ‘Market’ can refer to a more abstract and broader institution through which 
information is transmitted, in the form of ‘market signals’. 
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3. ‘Market’ may involve a complete abstraction from concrete trading places and 
individuals, meant to personify a collective will.  Something of this sort is meant 
when one reads that ‘financial markets will not tolerate high fiscal deficits’. 
4. Used as an adjective, ‘ market’ can refer to a system of regulation, or even a form 
of organisation for society as a whole.  It is this sense in which one uses the term 
‘market forces’ and ‘ reliance on markets’, as opposed to social regulation through 
collective action implemented by civil society or public sector institutions. 
 The potential for confusion can be demonstrated by taking an example.  In a paper 
on rural poverty, Ghai writes (Gaiha 1993, p. 64)  that rather than intervene directly in 
‘markets’, ‘ a more appropriate role for the government would be to reduce 
information…costs’  (Gaiha 1993, p. 64).   This begs the question of what a market is.  
How does a government reduce information costs in markets?  If improving information 
flows refers to concrete markets (#1), the task is a relatively simple one in developed 
countries of expanding communications systems, standardisation of weights and 
measures, improving market stalls, etc.  But, improving the efficiency of markets means 
considerably than these concrete activities, for it refers to the efficiency of market signals 
(#2).   Facilitating efficient market signals requires enforcing competition, and ensuring 
that private costs cover social costs (e.g., pollution costs).  Market signals will serve their 
function of regulating the allocation of resources if producers are ruled by market forces 
(#3).  For this to be the case, there must be a free market in land (which in many sub-
Saharan countries there is not), labour must be mobile (ethnic and other social 
distinctions may limit this), and the market-facilitating institutional framework 
established and clear.   
 In other words, improving the efficiency of markets is, in effect, the process of 
development itself.  This is obvious even for the apparently mundane task of improving 
information flows.  When villages have no modern communications, producers are 
illiterate in relevant languages, and there is distrust among regions or ethnic groups, 
improving information flows, much less creating the environment for market signals to 
rule decision making, is a long  term task of education, infrastructure development and 
the emergence of commercial institutions, such as for product grading. 
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 Some markets are the source of tremendous instability even in developed 
countries, with currency markets being a case in point.  However, overall markets create 
the possibility of hedging against unforeseen occurrences.  This hedging can take quite 
simple forms.  If an agricultural producer operates in an environment of relative cheap 
and reliable transport costs, he or she can shift between crops as prices fluctuate.  If 
transport is expensive and unreliable, there is no institution for product grading, etc., the 
producer’s options are limited to subsistence crops which can be sold be consumed or 
sold within the local community.  Thus, the underdevelopment of markets, part of 
underdevelopment in general, increases growth variability by reducing the options for 
adjusting to shocks, be they natural or market in origin. 
 Third, a weak state structure is a fundamental characteristic of underdevelopment.  
This takes several forms, and here the focus will be on policy instruments and 
implementation.  The principal vehicles of macroeconomic policy are taxation, 
expenditure, monetary instruments, and the exchange rate.  It is obvious that the first 
three are of limited use in reducing short-term growth variability in low-income 
countries.  Taxation is limited by the income inelasticity of the taxes which Sub-Saharan 
governments are capable of collecting.  Countercyclical expenditure is extremely difficult 
to implement, due to the heavy weight of inflexible spending in the total budget (health 
and education, for example).  The effectiveness of monetary instruments is directly 
correlated with the breadth of bond markets and, more fundamentally, the extent to which 
the formal banking system covers economic activity.  The great majority of Sub-Saharan 
countries haven o bond market at all, and those that exist are much too narrow to 
effective in counter-cyclical management of foreign exchange flows.  Thus, central 
governments are left with but one instrument for country-cyclical policy, the exchange 
rate.  However, many Sub-Saharan governments have chosen to ‘float’ their exchange 
rates within the context of stabilisation and structural adjustment programmes.   
 With producers limited in their ability to adjust to shocks due to absent or 
incomplete markets, and governments with virtually no countercyclical policy 
instruments, the potential for growth variability for Sub-Saharan countries is extremely 
high.  The previous section demonstrated that the potential has been realised to a striking 
degree.  Short-term growth variability has the tendency to reduce long term growth 
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stability for at least two reasons. First, variability increases the cost of planning for the 
future by generating a demand for various forms of insurance against disaster.  In the case 
of subsistence producers, these forms can involve reduction of investment activity.  
Second, as the international economy has become increasingly integrated, and Sub-
Saharan countries have become more open to international markets, growth variability 
has increasingly negative implications for foreign investment.  It is reasonable to assume 
that, other things equal, a foreign investor will feel more secure in a relatively stable 
growth environment than in a volatile one.  Unfortunately for the Sub-Saharan countries, 






 Over forty years, growth variability has been striking high in the Sub-Saharan 
countries.  Even should the optimistic projections proposed here be realised, the growth 
outcome would be quite modest.  The argument has been that the low growth is closely 
associated with growth variability:  the inability to sustain strong rates of growth.  The 
general explanation for this variability is underdevelopment itself.  This explanation 
implies that variability is only marginally responsive to short-term policy intervention.  
Certainly, unwise policy can make matters worse, but the instruments for short-term 
economic management are extremely ineffective in reducing variability.  Thus, a 
fundamental re-thinking of ‘appropriate macroeconomic policy’ is necessary.  This re-
thinking would be based upon the insight that macro instruments can do very little in the 






Table 1: Indicators of Growth Instability for the Sub-Saharan, 1961-1998 
      By decade  
Countries ordered by Percentage of Years >> aver SSA growth Relative (max = 4): No. yrs % of No. +/- 
Country Data yrs %>aver Grw rate Stdev Coef Var grw rate Top 10 Bot 10 >>|10| years consec 
Botswana 38 92 9.9 5.7 .57 2.73 4  1 3 0 
Guinea* 12 83 4.2 1.0 .23 1.38 1  0 0 0 
Uganda* 16 81 2.2 8.6 3.87  0.75 1  0 0 0 
Gabon 38 68 5.5 11.1 2.02  1.52 2  8 22 8 
Eq Guin* 14 64 5.2 5.0 .96 1.73 1 1 1 8 0 
Mauritius 38 63 5.2 6.5 1.26  1.43 3  10 27 6 
Swazild* 28 61 5.4 4.5 .84 1.61 1  1 4 0 
Cote d'Ivoire 38 61 4.7 5.8 1.24  1.29 2 1 5 14 4 
Malawi 38 61 4.4 5.6 1.29  1.21 3  7 19 6 
Lesotho 38 58 5.9 7.9 1.33  1.63 3  12 32 7 
Moz'que* 18 56 2.9 8.1 2.75  0.52 1 1 4 24 2 
Kenya 38 55 4.9 5.3 1.09  1.35 3  6 16 4 
Seychelles 38 55 4.7 6.5 1.39  1.29 1  4 11 3 
Gambia* 32 53 4.0 3.4 .87 1.13   1 3 0 
Ethiopia* 17 53 2.6 8.0 3.03  0.47   5 14 3 
Togo 38 53 4.1 6.8 1.66  1.13 1  7 19 6 
Rwanda 38 53 3.3 12.2 3.76  0.90  1 10 27 7 
Congo, Rp 38 53 4.5 6.4 1.43  1.24 1 1 2 5 0 
Angola* 18 50 1.8 8.0 4.55  0.31  1 2 12 2 
Benin 38 50 3.2 3.4 1.06  0.89 1 1 1 3 0 
Mauritania 38 50 3.6 6.6 1.82  1.01 1 2 11 30 9 
Eritrea* 6 50 4.6 4.4 .96 1.37 1  1 20 0 
Zimbabwe  38 47 4.3 5.8 1.37  1.18 2  6 16 4 
Nigeria 38 47 3.6 8.0 2.24  0.98 1 1 13 35 8 
Guinea-B* 28 46 2.2 8.6 3.87  0.66  1 9 33 6 
Ghana 38 45 2.5 4.6 1.87  0.68  2 3 8 0 
Burk Faso 38 45 3.4 3.4 1.00  0.95   2 5 0 
Senegal 38 45 2.5 4.5 1.83  0.68  1 8 22 6 
So Africa 38 42 3.3 3.9 1.20  0.90 1  3 8 2 
Sudan 38 42 3.3 6.4 1.90  0.92 1 1 6 16 4 
Cameroon 38 42 3.5 6.6 1.93  0.95 2 2 6 16 4 
Burundi 38 42 2.7 6.6 2.45  0.75 1 2 9 24 4 
Tanzania* 10 40 3.3 5.2 1.57  1.14   3 33 3 
Mali* 31 39 2.9 5.1 1.78  0.81  2 5 17 4 
Niger 38 39 1.7 6.5 3.73  0.48  2 6 16 6 
Chad 38 34 2.0 7.8 3.93  0.55 1 2 11 30 10 
CAR 38 32 1.5 4.1 2.79  0.41  4 3 8 2 
Congo DR 38 32 .2 6.3 27.82 0.06  2 2 5 2 
Namibia* 18 28 2.1 3.4 1.59  0.37  1 1 6 2 
Zambia 38 26 1.9 4.8 2.57  0.52  2 6 16 4 
Mad'car 38 24 1.5 3.5 2.39  0.40  4 2 5 0 
Srr Leone 38 21 .9 5.5 5.89  0.26     2 4 11 4 
Totals 1350  3.5 6.5 1.87  1.00 40 40 206 15.3 140 




Notes:           
Number of years refers to those with the GDP growth statistic.     
%>average is the number of years the country's growth rate was greater than the average for the years covered by its 
data (to one percentage point). 
Grw rate is the average for the years covered.       
Stdev is the standard deviation of the growth rate for the years covered.    
CoefVar is the standard deviation divided by the average (mean).     
Relative growth rate is the country average divided by the cross-country mean for the years covered for that country. 
Average growth rate by decade, no. of times, ranks the countries by growth rates, ten fastest growers and ten slowest. 
No of years >|10%| gives the number of years for which the country's growth rate increased or decreased by ten or 
more 
 percentage points compared to the previous year.     
Percentage of years is the percentage of years in which there was a change in the growth rate of an absolute value of 
 ten percentage points or more.       
No. +/- consecutive, gives the number of years for which a greater than ten percentage point change was followed by 
 another change greater than ten percent of the opposite sign.    
The simple correlation between the relative growth rate and the coefficient of variation of growth (omitting the extreme 




Table 2: Fastest and Slowest Growing Sub-Saharan Countries, by decades 
Fastest            (of 33)         
of 42 all years of 33  1960s of 33 1970s of 41 1980s of 42 1990s 
Botswana 9.9 Togo 9.1 Botswana 15.7 Botswana 10.6 Eq Guinea 7.1 
Lesotho 5.9 Cote d'Iv 8.7 Gabon 9.9 Congo, Rp 6.8 Uganda 6.8 
Gabon 5.5 Mauritania 8.1 Seychelles  9.2 Swaziland 6.8 Sudan 6.6 
Swaziland 5.4 Botswana 7.7 Lesotho 8.5 Chad 5.4 Lesotho 5.7 
Mauritius 5.2 Gabon 6.7 Cote d'Iv 7.6 Zimbabwe  5.2 Mauritius 5.4 
Kenya 4.9 SouAfrica 6.2 Cameroon 7.3 Guinea 4.5 Moz'bique 5.4 
Seychelles 4.7 Kenya 5.7 Kenya 7.2 Burundi 4.3 Botswana 4.8 
Cote d'I 4.7 Lesotho 5.5 Malawi 6.3 Mauritius 4.3 Eritrea 4.6 
Malawi 4.4 Malawi 5.3 Mauritius 7.2 Kenya 4.2 Benin 4.5 
Zimbabwe  4.3 Zimbabwe  4.7 Nigeria 7.0 Cameroon 4.0 Malawi 4.3 
average = 5.5   6.8  8.6  5.6  5.5 
stdev = 1.63  1.54  2.73  2.03  1.02 
Slowest        
Congo, DR .2 Chad 1.0 Chad -1.0 Cote d'Iv -.2 Congo DR -5.1 
Srra Leone .9 Sudan 1.2 Congo DR .3 Niger .0 Srr Leone -4.1 
CAfRep 1.5 Senegal 1.3 Ghana 1.4 Moz'bique  .4 Burundi -1.2 
Mad'car 1.5 CAfRep 1.9 Mad'car 1.5 Mad'car .4 Cameroon .0 
Niger 1.7 Mali 2.0 Zambia 1.6 Mali .5 Guinea-B .4 
Zambia 1.9 Cameroon 2.1 CAfRep 2.0 Mauritania .9 Zambia .8 
Chad 2.0 Ghana 2.3 Niger 2.2 Eq Guinea .9 Angola .8 
Ghana 2.5 Rwanda 2.6 Benin 2.3 CAfRp .9 CAfRep 1.0 
Senegal 2.5 Mad'car 2.8 Mauritania 2.6 Namibia .9 Congo Rep 1.3 
Burundi 2.7 Burundi 2.9 Srr Leone 2.7 Nigeria .9 Mad'car 1.3 
average = 1.7   2.0  1.6  .6  -.5 
stdev = .76  .69  1.15  .42  2.30 
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Table 3: Summary of Instability Measures by Region, 1961-1998  
      Percent of    
  Number of   Countries >|10|, % of Consecutive, gdp grw: 
Region  countries Growth rate for 0 & 1 all years % of >|10| coef var 
Sub-Sahara 42 3.5 21.4 15.3 68.0 2.05* 
Latin America & Carib 28 3.8 39.3 7.7 66.3 1.66 
Asia  20 5.7 40.0 6.3 28.2 .84 
NA&WE  16 3.6 31.3 19.6 68.2 1.53 
Totals  106   31.1 12.2 60.1 1.64 
*Omits Congo DR, with a coefficient of variation of 27.8.  The next largest was Angola 
at 4.6.        
Notes:        
Except for the sub-Sahara growth reversals of 10 percent or more were concentrated 
in a few countries:  Latin America and the Caribbean (21% in the Bahamas and Trini- 
dad & Tobago); Asia (31 percent in Bangladesh and Myanmar);  and North Africa &  
Western Asia (31 percent in Syria).      
 
 
Table 4: Accounting for Growth Instability 
among  
Across Sub-Saharan Countries, 1961-1998  
Dep variable:  Coefficient of Variation of GDP Growth 
Variables Coefficient T-statistic Signif  
Constant 1.972 2.84  .01  
Per cap Y -.247 -2.24  .05  
Petrol xpt  .424 1.53  nsgn  
Conflict .485 1.83  .10  
Adjusted     
R-square = .338    
F-stat = 6.17 @ .01   
DF = 38    
Notes:  The growth rate and per capita income are 
averages for the years for which there are data.  
Natural logarithm values were used.  
The simple correlation between the export share in 
GDP and per capita income is .48.   
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Table 5:  Number of Incidents of Per Capita Growth Equal to 
Or Greater Than 2.5 percent, Ten year Moving Average, 




 @ ≥ 2.5 
Consecutive 
 @ ≥ 2.5  (dates) 
Country 
Category 
Angola 0   6 
Benin 0   5 
Botswana 29 every year  1 
Burkina Faso 0   3 
Burundi 10 1971-79  6 
Cameroon 7 1981-87  4 
Central Afr Rep.  0   5 
Chad 4 1989-92  4 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 0   6 
Congo, Rep. 17 1973-89  2b 
Cote d'Ivoire 10 1970-79  2b 
Eq Guinea 3 1996-98  2a 
Eritrea* 0   6 
Ethiopia 0   6 
Gabon 14 1970-83  2b 
Gambia, The 1   5 
Ghana 0   5 
Guinea 0   3 
Guinea-Bissau 0   5 
Kenya 11 1971-81  2b 
Lesotho 19 1976-82, 1993-98 1 
Madagascar 0   5 
Malawi 9 1971-76, 1978-80 2b 
Mali 0   5 
Mauritania 5 1970-74  4 
Mauritius 23 1976-98  1 
Mozambique 5 1994-98  2a 
Namibia 0   5 
Niger 0   5 
Nigeria 9 1970-78  4 
Rwanda 5 1981-84  6 
Senegal 0   5 
Seychelles 24 1971-82, 1990-98 1 
Sierra Leone 2   6 
South Africa 7 1970-76  4 
Sudan 5 1995-98  2a 
Swaziland 11 1987-96  1 
Tanzania 0   5 
Togo 5 1970-74  4 
Uganda 3 1995-98  2a 
Zambia 0   5 
Zimbabwe  8 1970-77  4 
 
*Time series too short to yield 10 year moving average. 
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Table 6:  Categorisation of Sub-Saharan Countries by Long-Term Growth 





Countries (no. of 
periods and/or dates)  
Probability of g = 2.5  
& comment 




Long term growth 
 ≥ 2.5 pc for more 
than half of 10 year 
periods 
Botswana (29), Lesotho 
(19), Mauritius (23), 
Seychelles (24), 






for poverty reduction 
2. Many periods 
of high growth 






Growth  ≥ 2.5 pc in 
3 or more 10 year 
periods, ending in 
1998  
Eq Guinea (1996-98), 
Mozambique (1994-98), 






Policies for short-term 
stability  
 





Growth  ≥ 2.5 pc in 
3 or more 
consecutive 10 year 
periods, before 1990s  
Cameroon (1981-87), 















No periods  ≥ 2.5, 
average over 1.0  












(at least 5 periods  ≥ 
2.5) 
Chad (1989-92), Cote 
d’Ivoire (1971-79), 
Mauritania (5, 1971-74), 
Nigeria (9, 1970-78), 













No periods ≥ 2.5 pc, 
average < 1.0 
Benin, CAR, Ghana, 
Guinea-B, Madagascar, 











Affected by conflicts 
in 1990s 
Angola, Burundi (1970-
79), Congo DR, 
Eritrea*, Ethiopia, 
Rwanda (5, 1981-85), 






The dates in parenthesis are years of consecutive 10 year moving averages equal to or greater than 2.5 
percent per capita.  If these do not exhaust the incidence of such averages, the total number is given before 
the dates (the maximum for most countries is 29).  The numbers in bold are the country counts.  For the 
countries with more than half of years equal to or greater than 2.5 (category 1), only the number of years is 
given. 
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